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REPLY TO DEFENDANTS' STATEMENTS OF FACTS
In their respective Briefs, both the State and City Defendants
have set forth their own versions of the facts of this case.
Plaintiff's Statement of Facts in her Appellant's Brief clearly and
concisely

sets forth the relevant

facts of this case, with

appropriate references to the record on appeal. The State and City
Defendants have restated the facts, and inferences to be drawn
therefrom, in a light most favorable to the Defendants, not the
Plaintiff.
The Defendants' attempts to skew the facts in favor of their
arguments

are

inappropriate

and

contrary

to

clear Utah

law

regarding the standard of appellate review to be applied by this
Court upon review of the summary
Defendants.

judgments granted

for the

The facts must be considered by this Court as

contended by Plaintiff, as if they were the only credible evidence
before the Court.

(See Standards of Appellate Review set forth on

pp. 1-2 of Appellant's Original Brief).
In addition, the Defendants inappropriately include conclusions or beliefs of Trooper Colyar and Steven Floyd as "facts"
regarding whether or not the respective Defendants were negligent
in this case.

The Defendants have used their Statements of Facts

to inappropriately argue jury questions.
After reading the State's version of the facts of this case,
this Court might conclude that the high-speed chase of the Floyd
vehicle by Trooper Colyar was merely routine, went smoothly, and
did not endanger the public.

Nothing could be further from the

truth. The truth is that this high-speed chase was totally out of
control and endangered the lives and property of all meinbers of the
1

general public on or near the roads and highways utilized in the
chase.

Indeed, the most tragic and sobering fact of all is that

Plaintiff's husband was killed and Plaintiff was seriously and
permanently injured as a direct result of this high-speed chase.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS.
STATUTES AND RULES
Any relevant text of constitutional provisions, statutes or
rules determinative of or pertinent to the issues presented in this
appeal is contained in Plaintiff's original Brief, the body of this
Reply Brief, or in the Addendum to this Reply Brief.
ARGUMENT
POINT

I

APPLICATION OF FORMER U.C.A. S 63-30-7(2) (AMENDED 1990
AND REPEALED 1991) TO PLAINTIFF VIOLATES THE OPEN COURTS
PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.
The

Defendants, particularly

misconstrued,

mischaracterized,

the State

and

Defendants, have

apparently

misunderstood

Plaintiff's constitutional arguments in regard to why former U.C.A.
§ 63-30-7(2) violates the open courts provisions of Article I,
Section 11 of the Utah Constitution if applied to Plaintiff's
causes of action. The Defendants argue Plaintiff had no remedy at
common law and therefore former Section 63-3-7(2) did not eliminate
an existing common law remedy in violation of Article I, Section
11.
The State specifically argues it was absolutely immune from
tort liability at common law, and even the proprietary/governmental

2

function distinction did not apply to the State.1

Even if the

proprietary/governmental function distinction is applied, the State
argues that Trooper Colyar was engaged in a governmental function
in the high-speed chase.

Thus, the State argues, the State is

totally immune because the State would have been immune at common
law for injuries resulting from the pursuit. The conclusion of the
State's argument is since Plaintiff had no remedy against the State
under common law at the time of statehood, Plaintiff had no remedy
or right to recover protected by the open courts provisions of
Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution.
The Defendants have completely missed the boat in regard to
the

thrust

of

Plaintiff's

constitutional

argument

regarding

violation of Article I, Section 11. As will be demonstrated below,
the open courts violation occurs because the common law right to
sue individual governmental employees for their negligent acts was
eventually taken away by the Governmental Immunity Act, and former
U.C.A. § 63-30-7(2) then took away the substitute remedy against
governmental entities for the negligent acts of their employees.
When this occurred, Plaintiff's constitutional right under the open

1

The State points out that the arguments made in the State's
Brief essentially reiterate, in abbreviated form, the arguments
made by the Appellants and the State in Hipwell v. Sharp. Supreme
Court No. 920218, which has been argued orally and is currently
under advisement by the Utah Supreme Court. In Hipwell. as in the
instant case, the State is arguing that the Utah Supreme Court
erred in Condemarin v. University Hospital. 775 P.2d 348 (Utah
1989), by applying the proprietary/governmental function distinction to a state entity under early common law. This argument is a
"red herring" and inapposite to the instant case. Plaintiff's
constitutional arguments do not depend at all on the proprietary/
governmental distinction or the State's common law tort liability.
3

courts provisions of the Utah Constitution to redress of her
injuries in the courts was violated.
A.

Governmental employees were liable for their negligent acts at
common law.2
Commentators have recognized that under the early common law

there was no distinction between the liability of public officials
and ordinary citizens for negligence.

See, e.g., W. Gellhorn and

C. Byse, Administrative Law. § 8 at p. 335-36 (6th Ed. 1974) ;
G. Bermann, Integrating Governmental and Officer Tort Liability. 77
Columbia L.Rev. 1175-78 (1977) ; J. Flemming, Tort Liability of
Governmental Units and Their Officers, 22 U.Chi.L.Rev. 610, 635
(1955).

For example, Professor Bermann wrote in the Columbia Law

Review cited above:
The restlessness of the courts on the question of officer immunity reflects conflicting
policy considerations.
On the one hand,
wrongdoing seems worth deterring or punishing
whatever hat the wrongdoer happens to wear.
Moreover, there is something anomalous about
denying relief to a tort victim simply because
he had the added misfortune of being injured
by a public official rather than a private
citizen. Thus, the common law traditionally
did not distinguish between public officials
and private individuals for purposes of determining the scope of personal tort liability.
In fact, courts that drew such a distinction
often imposed a stricter standard of care on
officials than on private individuals, holding
them personally liable for the consequences of
simple non-negligent mistakes.
77 Columbia L.Rev. at 1178-79 (emphasis added).
Professor Bermann's article goes on to state that "more
recently"

courts

have

applied

2

the

discretionary/ministerial

The arguments under Subpoint A of Point I of this Reply
Brief substantially reiterate and/or expound upon arguments made by
the Plaintiffs/Appellees in Hipwell v. Sharp, supra.
4

distinction to governmental employees in determining their personal
liability.

Id.

Professor Flemming expounded upon this issue in his article in
the University of Chicago Law Review as follows:
The Anglo-American tradition did not include
a theory of immunity from suit or from liability on the part of public officers. It was
the boast of Dicey, often-quoted, that "[w]ith
us every official, from the Prime Minister
down to a constable or collector of taxes, is
under the same responsibility for every act
done without legal justification as any other
citizen." . . . [H]e was liable in very much
the same way as a private individual, including the employee of a private business, would
be.
Thus, were an officer, authorized by
statute to seize undried leather, mistakenly
but in good faith seized what turned out to be
dried leather, he was liable as a trespasser.
22 U.Chi.L.Rev. at 635 (emphasis added).
The common law on this issue in effect at the time of the
adoption of the Utah Constitution in 1896 is well illustrated by
Justice Holmes7 decision in Miller v. Horton, 26 N.E. 100 (Mass.
1891).

In that case, the town commissioners determined that the

plaintiffs7 horse had a contagious disease and ordered the Board of
Health to destroy the animal. The trial court found that the horse
did not in fact have the contagious disease, but held that the
defendants were nevertheless protected from liability.

Justice

Holmes held that the man who killed the horse was not protected
from liability by the fact that he had been ordered to do so by the
commissioners if the horse did not have the contagious disease, and
was fully liable for his wrongful act in destroying the horse. See
also, Lowe v. Conroy, 97 N.W. 942 (Wis. 1904) ; Davie v. Regents of
University of California. 227 P. 247 (Cal. 1924).
5

The Utah Supreme Court has also commented on this issue in the
fairly recent case of Payne ex rel. Payne v. Mvers. 743 P.2d 186
(Utah 1987), in which the Court stated that doctors as governmental
employees had no immunity from suit for their simple negligence at
common law. 743 P.2d at 188. The Court further stated as follows:
"Generally, at common law, one who suffers injury to his person or
property because of the negligence of another has a right of action
in tort.
added).

65A C.J.S. Negligence § 175, at 305 (1966)."

(emphasis

Id.

The discretionary ministerial distinction with respect to the
liability of governmental employees appears to have its roots in
the principle that judicial officers were absolutely immune from
liability in discharging their functions. This principle was later
expanded to quasi-judicial officers and then to administrative
employees as well.
supra.

W. Gellhorn and C. Byse, Administrative Law,

at p. 337-38.

discretionary/ministerial

However, it does not appear that the
distinction

immunizing

governmental

employees for discretionary acts gained much acceptance until the
1920's and 1930's, well after Utah became a state in 1896.

See,

e.g. , Wasserman v. Kenosha, 258 N.W. 857 (Wis. 1935); Gottschalk v.
Shepperd. 270 N.W. 573 (N.D. 1935).
B,

The Utah Governmental Immunity Act has taken away the common
law right to sue individual governmental employees for their
negligent acts.
When the Utah Governmental Immunity Act became effective in

1966, it had no provisions regarding the immunity of governmental
officials and employees. Its function was confined to governmental
entities. Frank v. State. 613 P.2d 517, 520 (Utah 1980).

In 1978,

Section 63-30-4 of the Act (Addendum 1) was amended to provide that
6

governmental employees could only be personally liable for their
gross negligence, fraud or malice.

Thus, the common law right to

sue individual governmental employees for simple negligence was
first abrogated in 1978.

Subsequently, in 1983, Section 63-30-4

was again amended to provide that a governmental employee could
only be personally liable for fraud or malice, thus eliminating
even the gross negligence cause of action (Addendum 2).
Pursuant to Section 63-30-4, the trial court in the instant
case ruled that Defendants Ken Colyar, Brad James and Ed Asay (the
pursuing police officers) must remain as parties to the lawsuit in
a representative capacity only, but no personal liability can
attach to these

individual

Defendants

as a result

of their

representative status (R. 80-82, 345-346, 525-526).
Therefore, Plaintiff's common law right to sue said individual
Defendants, and other as-yet unnamed governmental employees for
their negligent acts and omissions, has been taken away by the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act and the trial court's Orders applying the
Act to Plaintiff's causes of action.
C.

The Act, both prior and subsequent to the time former U.C.A.
S 63-30-7(2) was in effect, has substituted a reasonably
equivalent remedy against governmental entities.
In 1978, when the Act first took away the right to sue

individual governmental employees for simple negligence, and again
in 1983, when the Act further took away the right to sue even for
gross negligence, the Act had substituted a reasonably equivalent
remedy against a governmental entity employing the individual
governmental employee. Sections 63-30-7 and 63-30-10 continued to
provide a remedy against the governmental entity for the negligent
acts and omissions of governmental employees.
7

Specifically in regard to Plaintiff's causes of action for
negligence in the instant case for the high-speed pursuit, Section
63-30-7 waived immunity from suit of all governmental entities for
injury resulting from the negligent operation of motor vehicles by
governmental employees until 1990.

Thus, the Act continued to

offer a substitute remedy against governmental entities when it
took away the right to sue individual governmental employees for
simple negligence in 1978 and even gross negligence in 1983.
However, when subsection (2) to Section 63-30-7 was enacted
and became effective in 1990, it provided for complete and total
immunity for all governmental entities for injury resulting from
the collision of a pursued vehicle in high-speed police pursuits.
After an effective period of one year and six days, subsection (2)
was repealed by the legislature, and a new subsection (15) was
added to Section 63-30-10, which in effect reinstated the substitute remedy against governmental entitles which had been in effect
for the 24-year period from 1966 to 1990.
D.

Former U.C.A. S 63-30-7(2) violates the open courts provisions
because it took awav the remedy against governmental entities
without providing anv substitute remedy whatsoever.
During the one-year-and-six-day period that Section 63-30-7(2)

was in effect, the open courts provisions of Article I, Section 11
of the Utah Constitution were violated because the substitute
remedy of suing governmental entities for the negligent acts of
their police officers involved in high-speed chases was eliminated.
Thus, during this period of time, no remedy whatsoever was provided
to an injured plaintiff for the common law right to sue for
negligence. The Utah Supreme Court has consistently ruled that the
failure of the legislature to provide a reasonably equivalent
8

remedy when it abrogates a common law right of action constitutes
a violation of the open courts provisions of Article I, Section 11
of the Utah Constitution.3
E.

Plaintiff's causes of action seek to vindicate rights protected by the open courts provisions of Article I, Section 11.
In Berry ex rel. Berry, supra. the Utah Supreme Court stated

the following:

"Article I, section 11 of the Utah Constitution is

part of the Declaration of Rights. It declares that an individual
shall have a right to a 'remedy by due course of law' for injury to
'person, property or reputation."1

717 P.2d at 674. The Court in

Berry goes on to define the term "rights" as it is used with
reference to Article I, Section 11:
The term "rights" when used with reference
to section 11, is used loosely. Section 11
protects remedies bv due course of law for
injuries done to the substantive interests of
person, property, and reputation. What section 11 is primarily concerned with is not
particular, identifiable causes of action as
such, but with the availability of legal
remedies for vindicating the great interest
individuals in a civilized society have in the
integrity of their persons, property, and
reputations.
717 P.2d at 677, n. 4 (emphasis added).
Plaintiff's causes of action in the instant case seek remedies
by due course of law for the negligent acts and omissions of the
named Defendants and as-yet unnamed defendants if Plaintiff is

3

See Masich v. United States Smelting. Refining & Mining
Co. . 113 Utah 101, 191 P.2d 612, appeal dismissed, 335 U.S. 866
(1948); Berry ex rel. Berry v. Beach Aircraft Corp.. 717 P.2d 670
(Utah 1985); Condemarin v. University Hospital. 775 P.2d 348 (Utah
1989); Pavne ex rel. Payne v. Myers. 743 P.2d 186 (Utah 1987); Sun
Valley Waterbeds of Utah. Inc. v. Herm Hughes & Son. Inc. . 782 P.2d
188 (Utah 1989). All of these cases, with the exception of Masich.
are discussed in Point II.A of Plaintiff's original Brief. Masich
is discussed in detail by the Utah Supreme Court in Berry.
9

allowed her day in court.

The vindication of Plaintiff's common

law right to recover for injuries proximately

caused by the

negligent acts or omissions of others is clearly allowed under Utah
law and indeed guaranteed by the Utah Constitution in Article I,
Section 11.
Obviously, Plaintiff's particular, identifiable causes of
action in the instant case would not have arisen in 1896 at the
time of statehood, since motor vehicles had not yet been invented
and there was no such thing as a high-speed chase.

However, as

clearly pointed out by the Utah Supreme Court in Berry/ this fact
is irrelevant.

The important

fact

is that the open courts

provisions protect remedies by due course of law for injuries to
persons and property.

Plaintiff's negligence causes of action

clearly fall within the scope of the rights and remedies protected
by Article I, Section 11.
The Defendants in their respective Briefs erroneously argue
that Plaintiff's negligence claims are not recognized or remediable
under Utah law, regardless of any application of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.

The Defendants seek to define the issues in

this case as whether or not the pursuing police officers had a duty
to protect

innocent

third parties

from the

fleeing

driver's

negligence or recklessness, and whether or not this would make the
Defendants insurers of the acts of any such fleeing suspects.
The Defendants have completely misstated the issues and the
nature of Plaintiff's negligence claims.

Plaintiff does not seek

a single penny from any of the Defendants for the negligence or
recklessness of Steven Flovd, the fleeing driver.

Plaintiff only

seeks the opportunity for her day in court to present her negli10

aence claims to a jury to determine whether the Defendants should
be held accountable for their own negligence.

Indeed, the trial

court has already entered an Order joining Steven Floyd as a party
Defendant for purposes of comparing his negligence to that of the
Defendants pursuant to U.C.A. §§ 78-27-38 through 78-27-41 (R. 528529).
of

Thus, it will be for the jury to determine what percentage

negligence

responsible

for

Plaintiff's

claims

should

be

attributable to Floyd, the fleeing driver, and what percentage
should be attributable to the various Defendants.
Plaintiff will not reiterate here the extensive case law cited
in Point II.B of her original Brief, which establishes the clear
legal duty of pursuing police officers to innocent third parties in
high-speed chases and the validity of negligence causes of action
in such cases. A legal duty of due care is clearly imposed by Utah
law on police officers engaged in high-speed pursuits, both under
U.C.A. § 41-6-14 and under the common law irrespective of any
statutory obligation.4

Plaintiff also pointed out to the Court in

her original Brief that at least thirty-five cases from jurisdictions outside Utah have held that a legal duty exists in high-speed
chase cases analogous to Plaintiff's case and that the plaintiffs
in each of these thirty-five cases had valid causes of action.5
The State makes a specious argument and attempts to summarily
dismiss the holdings of the Utah Supreme Court in Cornwall v.
Larsen, supra.

Plaintiff would point out to the Court that

4

See the discussion of the following cases on pp. 24-26 of
Plaintiff's original Brief: Howe v. Jackson. 421 P.2d 159 (Utah
1966); Cornwall v. Larsen. 571 P.2d 925 (Utah 1977); and Malan v.
Lewis. 693 P.2d 661 (Utah 1984).
5

See pp. 26-30 of Plaintiff's original Brief.
11

Cornwall has been cited with approval by the Utah Supreme Court in
the subsequent cases of Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517, 520 (Utah
1980), and Condemarin v. University Hospital, 775 P.2d 348, 351,
382 (Utah 1989).

It is surprising that the State would attempt to

simply disregard the interpretation of U.C.A. § 41-6-14 by the Utah
Supreme Court in Cornwall,
It is also somewhat surprising that the State would make the
tenuous argument that Section 41-6-14 does not impose a legal duty
of due care on emergency vehicle operators, when the express
language of said statute clearly imposes such a duty.

The State

also vainly attempts to distinguish Section 41-6-14 from the
virtually identical statutes of other states which have held that
this statute clearly imposes a duty of care on police officers
involved in high-speed chases. The fact of the matter is that all
of these emergency vehicle statutes have the same origin and are
all virtually identical.

The State/s attempt to point out one or

two words which are different in the various statutes is an
argument totally without merit.
The State also erroneously relies on recent amendments to
Section 41-6-14, contained in S.B. No. 79, passed in the 1993
general session of the Utah Legislature (Addendum 3).

S.B. No. 79

was signed and approved by the Governor on March 12, 1993, and has
an effective date of July 1, 1993.

The State suggests that the

amendments to Section 41-6-14 support the State's argument that
this statute was not intended to impose a legal duty upon emergency
vehicle operators.
Nothing could be further from the truth. In fact, exactly the
opposition conclusion must be drawn from the amendments to Section
12

41-6-14 contained in S.B. No. 79,

The amendments specifically

delete the duty language contained in subsections (2)(c)

and (3) (a)

of the statute, thereby clearly recognizing that the deleted
language

imposed

a

statutory

duty

on

all

emergency

vehicle

operators to operate their vehicles so they do not endanger life or
property and with regard for the safety of all persons.
The few cases cited by the Defendants in their respective
Briefs are either factually inapposite to Plaintiff's causes of
action in Utah because of different statutory schemes, or represent
an archaic and disappearing viewpoint of a few jurisdictions; a
viewpoint which is totally inconsistent and irreconcilable with the
recent Utah Supreme Court decisions limiting and

restricting

governmental immunity as cited in Plaintiff's original Brief. In
addition, many of the cases "string-cited" by the State on pp. 1617 of the State's Brief have been overruled and/or do not support
the State's arguments against Plaintiff's negligence claims under
the facts of the instant case.
The Defendants rely heavily in their Briefs on the case of
Thornton v. Shore. 666 P.2d 655 (Kan. 1983), for the argument that
Plaintiff has no valid cause of action in the instant case.
Plaintiff submits that Thornton is a poorly-reasoned, resultoriented

decision

which

represents

a

dwindling

minority

of

jurisdictions in this country. Moreover, most of the cases relied
upon by the Thornton Court are either old, outdated cases; are
statutorily or factually distinguishable; or have simply been
reversed or overruled by subsequent case law.
For example, Chambers v. Ideal Pure Milk Co.. 245 S.W.2d 589,
590-91

(Kan.App. 1952), is forty-one years old and completely
13

outdated by the modern trend of authority regarding negligence,
pursuit cases and governmental immunity.
The Thornton Court and the Defendants herein have also cited
and relied upon State of West Virginia v. Fidelity & Casualty Co.
of New York, 263 F.Supp. 88 (S.D.W.Va. 1967).

This case, which

ostensibly applied West Virginia law in 1967, has clearly been
rejected by the recent case of Peak v. Rati iff, 408 S.E.2d 300
(W.Va. 1991).

In Peak, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West

Virginia specifically rejected the standard set out by the Kansas
Supreme Court

in Thornton which gives total

pursuing officer.

immunity

to the

Moreover, the Thornton Court's conclusion that

the fleeing driver is the only party responsible for the injuries
arising from the collision between the pursued vehicle and that of
an innocent third party was also flatly rejected.

408 S.E.2d at

306f 307.
The Defendants also heavily rely upon the case of Reenders v.
City of Ontario, 137 Cal.Rptr. 736 (Cal.App. 4 Dist. 1977).

This

case is the only California case which supports the erroneous
arguments advanced by the Defendants in the instant case. The fact
of the matter is that Reenders is a sixteen-year old rogue decision
which has fallen into complete disfavor,, even in California, as
none of the other districts have followed it.

All of the other

California districts of the Court of Appeals, and the United States
District Court for the Central District of California (applying
California law), have held that police in a pursuit of a suspect
have a legal duty to drive in such a manner as to not impose on
others an unreasonable risk of harm, which includes when the
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motorist being pursued by the police collides with an innocent
victim.6
The Defendants' heavy reliance on Kellv v. City of Tulsa, 791
P.2d 826 (Okla.App. 1990) , is also misplaced.

In Kellv, the

pursuit lasted approximately one minute, for a distance of one and
one-quarter miles, at a speed estimated at

60-65 miles per hour,

and only two other vehicles were on the road during the pursuit.
The Kelly Court specifically held that under the undisputed facts
of this case, "unlike the cases relied upon by Plaintiff" the
"pursuit was not so extreme or outrageous as to pose a higher
threat to public safety than ordinarily incident to high-speed
police pursuit."

(emphasis added).

791 P.2d at 829. Thus, it is

clear the Oklahoma Court of Appeals based its decision on the
"routine" nature of the pursuit in that case.

The Kelly case is

clearly factually inapposite to the extreme, out-of-control pursuit
in the instant case. Furthermore, the Oklahoma Court of Appeals in
Kelly relied almost exclusively on the poorly-reasoned case of
Thornton v. Shore, supra.
POINT

II

APPLICATION OF FORMER U.C.A. S 63-30-7(2) (AMENDED 1990
AND REPEALED 1991) TO PLAINTIFF VIOLATES THE EQUAL
PROTECTION AND DUE PROCESS PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION.
The arguments by both the State and City Defendants in
opposition to Plaintiff's claims of equal protection and due
6

See Stark v. City of Los Angeles, 214 Cal.Rptr. 216
(Cal.App. 2 Dist. 1985); Duarte v. City of San Jose. 161 Cal.Rptr.
140 (Cal.App. 1 Dist. 1980); Gibson v. City of Pasadena, 148
Cal.Rptr. 68 (Cal.App. 2 Dist. 1978); City of Sacramento v.
Superior Court, 182 Cal.Rptr. 443 (Cal.App. 3 Dist. 1982); West v.
United States, 617 F.Supp. 1015 (D.C. Cal. 1985)(applying California law) .
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process violations rest entirely upon the erroneous argument that
former U.C.A. § 63-30-7(2) did not abrogate Plaintiff's rights
under the open courts provisions of Article I, Section 11 of the
Utah Constitution.

Based upon this faulty premise, the Defendants

argue that Plaintiff has never had a valid cause of action under
Utah law, and there can therefore be no equal protection or due
process violation. As already established in Point I of this Reply
Brief, supra, these arguments by Defendants are fallacious because
Plaintiff's negligence claims in the instant case seek vindication
of rights clearly protected under Article I, Section 11. Thus, the
Defendants

essentially

have

no

argument

left

challenging

Plaintiff's arguments that she has been denied equal protection and
due process under Article I, Section 24 and Article I, Section 7 of
the Utah Constitution.
Plaintiff will not reiterate here the equal protection and due
process arguments set forth in Points III and IV of her original
Brief. Plaintiff would emphasize to the Court that the "heightened
scrutiny" standard applied in Condemarin v. University Hospital,
supra, is the proper standard to apply in the instant case.

In

that case, the Utah Supreme Court applied the heightened scrutiny
standard in analyzing the equal protection and due process issues
and properly determined that a mere damage limitation on potential
recovery from the University Hospital violated equal protection and
due process, as well as the open courts provisions of the Utah
Constitution.

The Condemarin decision recognized that even a mere

damage limitation severely restricted the important substantive
right of an individual to recover for personal injuries. The Court
noted that the classifications created by the statute in question
16

interfered with the "fundamental principle of American law that
victims of wrongful or negligent acts should be compensated to the
extent that they have been harmed."

775 P.2d at 354.

The Court,

citing a 1975 decision by the Washington Supreme Court, further
observed the following:
The right to be [compensated] for personal
injuries is a substantial property right, not
only of monetary value but in many cases
fundamental to the injured person's physical
well-being and ability to continue to live a
decent life. (citation omitted).
775 P.2d at 360.
In the instant case, the restriction of Plaintiff's rights is
far more egregious that the damage limitation in Condemarin.
Plaintiff's access to the courts for redress of her injuries has
been totally eliminated by application of former U.C.A. § 63-307(2) , not just restricted as in Condemarin. Plaintiff respectfully
submits that the equal protection and due process violations are
clear in Plaintiff's case, either under the heightened scrutiny
standard or under the traditional rational basis standard.
As pointed out in Plaintiff's original Brief, U.C.A. § 63-307(2) was passed by the legislature based upon significant misinformation and untrue statements, and also upon a phantom crisis
fearing a rash of "frivolous" lawsuits being filed in police
pursuit situations.

In the instant case, the Defendants did not

present one iota of evidence indicating that a single "frivolous"
lawsuit had ever been filed in the State of Utah by an innocent
victim to recover from injuries incurred from a high-speed chase.
Furthermore, Plaintiff believes that no such evidence exists, and
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that there has never been a "frivolous11 lawsuit filed in Utah in
this regard.
POINT

III

THE DEFENDANT GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES ARE NOT IMMUNE FROM
SUIT UNDER THE DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION EXCEPTION INU.C.A,
6 63-30-10(1).
U.C.A.
governmental

§

63-30-10(1)

retains

governmental

immunity

for

entitles for negligent acts or omissions of an

employee when the injury arises out of a discretionary function.
Except in response to the Defendants' erroneous arguments regarding
application of the discretionary/ministerial distinction, Plaintiff
will not reiterate the arguments set forth in Point V of her
original Brief.
However, it is necessary to point out again that the Defendants have absolutely disregarded the clear holding of the Utah
Supreme Court in Cornwall v. Larsen, 571 P.2d 925 (Utah 1977).
Cornwall held that a police officer responding to an emergency
situation in his police car is an employee performing a ministerial
act and not a discretionary act. 571 P.2d at 927. The subsequent
case of Frank v. State. 613 P.2d 517, 520 (Utah 1980), cited by the
State in its Brief, clearly reaffirms the holding in Cornwall.
Therefore, it is simply beyond question and should be laid to rest
that the pursuing police officers in the high-speed chase in the
instant case were performing ministerial acts, and therefore their
respective governmental employers are not immune from suit under
U.C.A. § 63-30-10(1).
Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint also contains causes of
action against the Defendant governmental entities for negligent
training and supervision of police officers regarding high-speed
18

pursuits, and negligent implementation of procedures to be used in
such high-speed pursuits. The Defendants mistakenly rely on Little
v. Utah State Division of Family Services, 667 P.2d 49 (Utah 1983),
and Doe v. Arcruelles. 716 P.2d 279 (Utah 1985).

Both of these

cases support Plaintiff's argument that the alleged negligence of
the as-yet unnamed individuals responsible for training, supervision and implementation of procedures occurred during the performance of ministerial functions.
In Little, the Utah Supreme Court held that the failure of the
Division of Family Services to properly evaluate a foster home,
supervise a child's placement, and protect her from harm constituted a breach of conduct implemental in nature and thus properly held
actionable when found to be negligent.

667 P.2d at 52.

In Doe,

the Utah Supreme Court held that the negligent supervision of a
juvenile released into the community on probation was not protected
as a discretionary function.

The Court stated that:

"A decision

or action implementing a preexisting policy is operational in
nature and is undeserving of protection under the discretionary
function exception."

(emphasis added).

716 P.2d at 283.

The training and supervision of police officers and the
implementation of procedures to be used in high-speed pursuits are
operational in nature and merely implement the preexisting policy
of the Department of Public Safety to identify and apprehend
violators of the criminal law, utilizing pursuit driving when
necessary.

Therefore, Plaintiff's negligence claims regarding

training, supervision and implementation of procedures are based
upon the ministerial functions of the various responsible employees.
19

POINT

IV

QUESTIONS REGARDING CAUSATION AND NEGLIGENCE OF THE
DEFENDANTS ARE QUESTIONS OF FACT FOR THE JURY TO DETERMINE,
A*

Summary judgment was improperly granted for the State Defendants .
Plaintiff has fully briefed the causation and negligence

issues presented by the instant case in Point VI of her original
Brief, and will not reiterate those arguments here. Suffice it to
say that clear Utah law and the overwhelming weight of authority
from jurisdictions throughout the country provide that issues of
proximate causation and negligence are questions of fact to be
determined by the finder of fact, and cannot be resolved as a
matter of law on motions for summary judgment.7
Surprisingly, the State actually puts forth the specious
argument

that

summary

judgment was properly

granted

against

Plaintiff even under a gross negligence standard, rather than a
simple negligence standard. The State completely ignores decisions
of the Utah Supreme Court and mistakenly relies entirely on a few
factually inapposite decisions from other jurisdictions. Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court has flatly stated that the ordinary

7

The Utah case law is set forth on pp. 40-43 of Plaintiff7s
Original Brief. Although there are no Utah appellate cases directly
dealing with high-speed pursuit situations such as presented in the
instant case, the Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that
issues of proximate cause and negligence are factual issues and
cannot be resolved as a matter of law on summary judgment. On pp.
43-45 of her original Brief, Plaintiff cites twentv-one cases from
jurisdictions outside of Utah which have held summary judgment on
the issues of negligence (breach of duty) and proximate cause is
inappropriate in cases involving high-speed pursuits where the
pursued vehicle causes injury to a third person.
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reasonable care standard applies to operators of emergency vehicles
and all motor vehicles in general.8
Moreover, the State Defendants, apparently disregarding the
fact that they were the prevailing parties on their motions for
summary judgment, inappropriately attempt to skew the facts of this
case in their favor by claiming that the "danger involved in the
pursuit did not clearly exceed the legitimate need to immediately
apprehend Floyd, who Colyar reasonably suspected of having engaged
in conduct considerably more serious that a speeding violation."
This statement is clearly contrary to the facts of this case. The
facts are that Colyar had absolutely no reason whatsoever to
suspect Floyd of having engaged in conduct any more serious than a
speeding violation, and the pursuit clearly exceeded the legitimate
need to apprehend Floyd.

Moreover, Plaintiff is entitled to have

all facts and inferences drawn therefrom viewed by this Court in a
light most favorable to Plaintiff, not the State.
The State also argues it was not foreseeable that Floyd would
"act so recklessly as to run a red light" and strike another
vehicle, and "the risk involved in this pursuit was no greater than
the risk ordinarily involved in a high-speed pursuit."

The truth

of the matter is the facts of this case compel the opposite conclusion. Floyd was exceeding 120 miles per hour, running cars off the
road, and in fact crashed into a semi-truck on the on-ramp to 1-15
from Spanish Fork towards Provo and still proceeded to try to
outrun the pursuing officers.

Furthermore, whether or not it was

8

See Howe v. Jackson. 421 P.2d 159, 161-62 (Utah 1966);
Cornwall v. Larsen, 571 P.2d 925, 928-29 (Utah 1977); Malan v.
Lewis. 693 P.2d 661, 673 (Utah 1984); all cited and discussed,
supra.
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"foreseeable" that Floyd would injure an innocent third party is
precisely the proximate cause issue which the Utah Supreme Court
has directly held is a question of fact which precludes summary
judgment.
B.

Summary judgment was improperly granted for the City Defendants .
For the same reasons that summary judgment was improperly

granted for the State Defendants, it was also improperly granted
for the City Defendants.

The City Defendants' entire argument

rests on the proposition that Officers James and Asay were not the
initial pursuing officers, and since they were in pursuit behind
Trooper Colyar they cannot be negligent as a matter of law.
Plaintiff submits that this is an untenable argument.
Whether or not the fleeing driver, Steven Floyd, ever saw
Officers James or Asay in his rear-view mirror, or whether or not
James or Asay might have been able to "leap frog" past Trooper
Colyar during the chase, are simply not the relevant issues in this
case. According to the theory of the City Defendants, if James or
Asay had been able to pass Trooper Colyar and be the lead chase car
behind Floyd, then they would have been liable, and not Colyar.
The fact that Floyd may have only seen Colyar in his rear view
mirror is irrelevant, as the important issue is whether James and
Asay contributed to the "zone of danger" created by the high-speed
pursuit, and whether it was foreseeable that Flovd might injure an
innocent third party.

These are clearly guestions of fact to be

decided by the finder of fact, and preclude summary judgment for
the City Defendants in the instant case. It is the province of the
jury to apportion the negligence among the various pursuing police
22

officers and governmental entities.

The trial court usurped the

function of the jury by granting the City Defendants7 motion for
summary judgment.
POINT

V

SOUND PUBLIC POLICY DEMANDS JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY FOR
HIGH-SPEED PURSUITS WHICH INJURE OR KILL INNOCENT
BYSTANDERS,
Since Plaintiff's deceased husband, Boyd Day, was killed on
March 18, 1991, at least three other totally innocent people have
died in Utah as a direct result of high-speed chases in which the
fleeing driver killed an innocent victim.

In all four of these

cases, the initial justification for the pursuit involved a minor
misdemeanor traffic violation.

Indeed, statistics show that

approximately seventy-two percent (72%) of all chases stem from
traffic violations.

Panic by the suspected offender, often times

involving a fear of losing a drivers license, is the common reason
for attempting to outrun the police.

In addition to the four

innocent people killed in the past two years or so, several
innocent people have been severely injured, including Plaintiff;
and at least two fleeing suspects themselves have been killed in
high-speed chases.9
Because of these deaths caused by high-speed police pursuits,
Chief Ruben Ortega

of the Salt Lake City

Police

Department

announced a new policy in January of 1993 for high-speed pursuits.
Noting that six people had been killed in Salt Lake County during
9

All of the above information is taken from a newspaper
article: Norma Wagner, Police Chases: Deadly Force at High Speed.
Salt Lake Tribune, Sunday, November 22, 1992, at Al and A10-11.
Plaintiff would refer the Court to this article which takes
approximately two full newspaper pages for a detailed analysis of
high-speed police chases in Utah.
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the past two years as a result of police pursuits, Chief Ortega
stated the Salt Lake City Police can no longer afford to pursue
those suspected of misdemeanors and traffic violations.

Conse-

quently, Chief Ortega and the Salt Lake City Police Department
adopted a new policy which now limits pursuits to suspects of
violent crimes such as robbery/ rape, burglary, and homicide.10
The Defendants argue in their respective Briefs that "sound
public policy" weighs against imposing any liability whatsoever for
police pursuit of fleeing violators, regardless of the risk created
to the general public. The trial court in its Minute Entry Ruling
and Orders Granting the Defendants7 Motions for Summary Judgment
also ruled that the appropriate public policy
completely

insulate

police

officers

and

in Utah is to

their

governmental

employers from any liability for high-speed chases (R. 530-535,
545, 548).
Plaintiff

respectfully

demands judicial

submits

accountability

that

sound

public

policy

of police officers and their

governmental employers for high-speed pursuits which injure or kill
totally innocent bystanders. There is simply no justification for
high-speed chases of drivers suspected of minor traffic violations.
Plaintiff's response to the argument of the Defendants and the
trial court that a fleeing suspect can evade police by driving at
a high rate of speed into a congested traffic area is "so be it."
Is the life of a totally innocent human being worth the necessity
to

apprehend

a

fleeing

driver

10

suspected

of a minor

traffic

All the above information is taken from a newspaper article:
Chris Jorgensen, Salt Lake Police Hit Brakes on Pursuit Policy, Set
UP Review Boards. Salt Lake Tribune, January 30, 1993, at CI.
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violation?

Plaintiff submits that sound public policy must answer

this question strongly in the negative.
If various police agencies continue to insist on engaging in
high-speed pursuits involving suspected minor traffic violators,
the only way to hold such agencies accountable is to ensure they
are liable for their own negligence in any such chases.

Police

officers and their governmental employers cannot be given carte
blanche authority and immunity in regard to the pursuit of minor
traffic violators.

Such high-speed pursuits create inherently

dangerous and unnecessary risks to the general public which cannot
be justified.
CONCLUSION
For

all

the

foregoing

reasons

and

those

set

forth

in

Plaintiff's original Brief, it is respectfully submitted that the
judgment of the trial court should be reversed in its entirety, and
Plaintiff should be allowed to proceed to trial on her First
Amended Complaint.
DATED this

'

day of

., 1993.

LARRY R. KELLER & ASSOCIATES

R. KELLER

f€t/>s^
CRAIG

fZ.J^r&^k*™BOORMAN

Attorneys for Plaintiff/ Appellant
Mary Day
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ADDENDUM

1

1 9 7 8 AMENDMENTS TO U . C . A .
Ch. 27

§

63-30-4

State Affairs In General

[92]

Section 1. Section amended.
Section 63-30-2, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by Chapter 139,
Laws of Utah 1965, as amended by Chapter 103, Laws of Utah 1973, is
amended to read:
63-30-2. Definitions.
As used in this act:
(1) The word "state'' shall mean the state of Utah or any office, department, agency, authority, commission, board, institution, hospital, college,
university or other instrumentality thereof;
(2) The words "political subdivision" shall mean any county, city, town,
school district, public transit district, redevelopment agency, special improvement or taxing district, or any other political subdivision or public
corporation:
(3) The words "governmental entity" shall mean [ajid-iaetede] the state
and its political subdivisions as defined herein;
(4) The word "employee" shall mean
any officer, employee
or servant of a governmental entity including student teachers certificated
in accordance with section 53-2-15, educational aides, volunteers and
tutors;
(5) The word "claim" shall mean any claim brought against a governmental entity or its employee [as^era&ted-by-frhio act*] for which the entity
may be liable;
(6) The word "injury" means death, injury to a person, damage to or
loss of property, or any other injury that a person may suffer to his person,
or estate, that would be actionable if inflicted by a private person or his
agent.
Section 2. Section amended.
Section 63-30-3, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by Chapter 139,
Laws of Utah 1965, is amended to read:
63-30*3. Immunity of governmental entities from suit.
Except as may be otherwise provided in this act, all governmental entities [-9kaH-be3 are immune form suit for any injury which [mey-pesHfe-foftn
vAC UCtlVltlCS Ol 9QJ.Q. CRtltlCO WnCrCHT OQIQ Cuun>3^ i o OngQgQQ Hft ^Tre GX0F616O

«a»d-<iisehaFge- ef-a-gevenwaaentel- -fofiefciei*] results from the exercise of a
governmental function, governmentally-owned hospital, nursing home, or
other governmental health care facility.
Section 3. Section amended.
Section 63-30-4, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by Chapter 139,
Laws of Utah 1965, is amended to read:
63-30-4. Act provisions not construed as admission or denial of liability—
Effect of waiver of immunity—Exclusive remedy—Joinder of

[93]

State Affairs In General

Ch. 27

employee—Limitations on personal liability.
Nothing contained in chis act, unless specifically provided, is to be construed as an admission or denial of liability or responsibility in so far as governmental entities are concerned. Wherein immunity from suit is waived by
this act, consent to be sued is granted and liability of the entity shall be determined as if the entity were a private person.
The remedy against a governmental entity or its employee for an injury
caused by an act or omission which occurs during the performance of such
employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority is, after the effective date of this act, exclusive of any other civil
action or proceeding by reason of the same subject matter against the employee or the estate of the employee whose act or omission gave rise to the
claim, unless the employee acted or failed to act through gross negligence,
fraud, or malice.
An employee may be joined in an action against a governmental entity in
a representative capacity if the act or omission complained of is one for
which the governmental entity may be liable, but no employee shall be held
personally liable for acts or omissions occurring during the performance of
the employee's duties, within the scope of employment or under color of
authority, unless it is established that the employee acted or failed to act
due to gross negligence, fraud or malice.
Section 4. Section amended.
Section 63-30-5, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by Chapter 139,
Laws of Utah 1965, as amended by Chapter 189, Laws of Utah 1975, is
amended to read:
63-30-5. Waiver of immunity as to contractual obligations.
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived as to any contractual obligation and actions arising out of contractual rights or obligations shall not be subject to the requirements of sections 63-30-11. 63-30-12,
63-30-13 or 63-30-19 of this act.
Section 5. Section amended.
Section 63-30-11, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by Chapter 139,
Laws of Utah 1965, is amended to read:
63-30-11. Claim for injury—Notice—Claimant's petition for relief—Service—Legal disability effect.
Any person having a claim for injury to person or property against a
governmental entity or its employee [isey-pefcifcien-9fti4] shall, before maintaining an action under this act, file a written notice of claim with such
entity for [any] appropriate relief including [fcheawa*€k>#] money damages.
The notice of claim shall set forth a brief statement of the facts and the
nature of the claim asserted, shall be signed by the person making the claim
or such person's agent, attorney, parent or legal guardian, and shall be

ADDENDUM

2

1 9 8 3 AMENDMENTS TO U . C . A .
[545]

§

63-30-4

GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY

Ch. 129

(5) [The word "claim" shall mean] "Claim" means any claim [brought]
or cause of action for monev or damages against a governmental entity or
[+B] against an employee [for which the entity may be liablej:
(6) [The word "injury"] "Injury" means death, iniury to a person,
damage to or loss of property, or any other injury that a person may suffer to
his person, or estate, that would be actionable if inflicted by a private person
or his agent:
(7) "Personal iniurv" means an injury of anv kind other than property
damage:
(8) "Property damage" means injury to. or loss of. anv right, title, estate.
or interest in real or personal property.
Section 3. Section amended.
Section 63-30-4. Utah Code Annotated 1953. as last amended by Chapter
27. Laws of Utah 1978. is amended to read:
* * * * 63-30-4. Act provisions not construed as admission or denial of liability—
Effect of waiver of immunity—Exclusive remedy—Joinder of employee—
Limitations on personal liability.
(1) Nothing contained in this [aet] chapter, unless specifically provided. [»
*e] shall be construed as an admission or denial of liability or responsibility in
so far as governmental entities or their employees are concerned. [Wherein]
If immunity from suit is waived by this [aet] chapter, consent to be sued is
granted and liability of the entity shall be determined as if the entity were a
private person.
(2) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as adversely affecting anv
immunity from suit which a governmental entity or employee mav otherwise
assert under state or federal law.
(3) The remedy against a governmental entity or its employee for an
injury caused by an act or omission which occurs during the performance of
such employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of
authority is. after the effective date of this act. exclusive of any other civil
action or proceeding by reason of the same subject matter against the
employee or the estate of the employee whose act or omission gave rise to
the claim, unless the employee acted or failed to act through [gross ncgli
gence,] fraudf-^ or malice.
(4) An employee may be joined in an action against a governmental
entity in a representative capacity if the act or omission complained of is one
for which the governmental entity may be liable, but no employee [skaH-] may
be held personally liable for acts or omissions occurring during the performance of the employee's duties, within the scope of employment or under
color of authority, unless it is established that the employee acted or failed to
act due to [gross negligence.] fraud or malice.
v*^'

Section 4. Section amended.
Section 63-30-5. Utah Code Annotated 1953. as last amended by Chapter
27, Laws of Utah 1978. is amended to read:

ADDENDUM

3

1993 AMENDMENTS TO U.C.A. § 41-6-14

s# B# N o # ?g

Section 3.

Section

41-6-14,

Utah

Code

Annotated

(Effective 7/1/93)

1953, as last

amended by Chapter 138, Laws of Utah 1987, is amended to read:
41-6-14,

Emergency vehicles —

Policy regarding vehicle pursuits

Applicability of traffic law to highway work vehicles —

—

Exemptions.

(1) The operator of an authorized emergency vehicle, when responding
to

an

emergency

call

or when in the pursuit of an actual or suspected

violator of the law or when responding to but not upon returning
fire

alarm, may

from

a

exercise the privileges under this section, subject to

[Stxbseetion] Subsections (2) through (4).
(2) The operator of an authorized emergency vehicle may:
(a) park or stand, irrespective of the provisions of this chapter;
(b) proceed past a red or stop signal or stop sign, but

only

after

slowing down as may be necessary for safe operation;
(c) exceed

the

maximum

speed

limits

[if—the—operator-does-not

endanger-iife-or-property]; or
(d) disregard regulations governing direction of movement or turning
in specified directions,
(3) Privileges granted under this section
authorized

emergency

the

operator

of

an

vehicle, who is not involved in a vehicle pursuit,

apply only when the operator of the
under

to

vehicle

sounds

an

audible

signal

Section 41-6-146, or uses a visual signal as defined under Section

41-6-132, which is visible from in front of the vehicle.
[4a}—fhe-privTieges-ander-thTS-section-do-not-reiieve—the—operator
of—an—anthorired-emergency—vehicie-from-the-daty-to-operate-the-vehTcie
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wrth-regard-for-the-safety-of-att-persons7-or-proteet-the—operator—from
the-eonseqaenees-of-an-arbrtrary-exercise-of-the-prTviiegesT]
(4) Privileges

granted

under

this

section

to the operator of an

authorized emergency vehicle involved in any vehicle pursuit

apply

only

when:
(a) the

operator of the vehicle sounds both an audible signal under

Section 41-6-146 and uses

a

visual

signal

as

defined

under

Section

41-6-132, which is visible from in front of the vehicle;
(b) the

public agency employing the operator of the vehicle has, in

effect, a written policy which describes the manner and circumstances

in

which any vehicle pursuit should be conducted and terminated;
(c) the

operator of the vehicle has been trained in accordance with

the written policy described in Subsection (4)(b); and
(d) the pursuit policy of the public agency is in
standards

established

by

the

conformance

with

Department of Public Safety, Division of

Peace Officer Standards and Training, which shall adopt minimum standards
that shall be incorporated into all emergency pursuit policies adopted by
public agencies authorized to operate emergency pursuit vehicles*
[fb*] £5) Except for Sections 41-6-13.5, 41-6-44, and 41-6-45, this
chapter

does

not

apply to persons, motor vehicles, and other equipment

while actually engaged in work upon the surface of a
the

entire

highway.

However,

chapter applies to those persons and vehicles when traveling

to or from the work.
Section 4.

Section 53A-16-101, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as

by Chapter 2, Laws of Utah 1988, is amended to read:
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